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The DeveJopment of Party Financing in Germany: 
Indicator of a Change from Volksparteien 
(People's Parties) to State Parties? 
Hans Herbert von Arnim 
Trus short paper represents an effort to deal with some valid 
criticism concerning the development of political parties in Germany. 
With the issue ofpublic party financirig as a background, the question 
poses itself whether parties and the party system in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany have been in the proeess of changing their eharacter in 
the course of the past decades, and which role party financing has 
played. To do this, it is necessary to describe public party financing in 
context1, dealing especially with the money parties get from the state, 
but also touerung on the non-flllancial benefits as weIL 
1. The Fathers (and those few Mothers) of the Basic Law of 
1949 (German Constitution) were still under the impression that 
political parties would be financed solely from private sourees, and 
above a11 from membership dues and from donations. For this reason, 
they saw but one danger--the possible influence of big money on 
politics--and they tried to avert this danger by requiring transparency. 
According to the Basic Law (Art. 21, Para. 1, 4th sentence), parties are 
obligated to present a public accounting of the origin of their funds. 
However, this obligation remained unfulfilled for a long time. For 
eighteen years, the parties in government, which were especially 
dependent on contributions, blocked the "Law Conceming Political 
Parties." 
2. When public party finaneing was nevertheless introduced in 
1959, after a hasty obiter dictum of the Federal Constitutional Court in 
1958 had paved the way, it was a European "first" and would even 
have been a world premiere had Costa Rica (1954) and Argentina 
(1955) not already introduced public financing ofparties before. In 
1959, it began by allocating fi ve million DM (Deutschmark) in the 
I For details refer to Hans Herbert von Amim, Die Partei, der Abgeordnete und das Geld. 
Parteijinanzierung in Deutschland, Knaur Verlag, Muenchen, 1996 .. 
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federal budget for party financing. By 1964, the surn had grown to 
thirty-eight million DM and, according to a draft bill by the govern-
ment of the same year, it was to increase to over ninety million DM 
peryear. 
Itis this explosion in finances wh ich caused the Constitu-
tional Court to puH the emergency brake. In a 1966 decision, it 
allowed only the reirnbursement of election campaign expenses from 
the treasury, and this required a law. (The court regarded the 
former appropriation of funds solely out of the budget as insuffi-
cient.) As the parties did not want to give up the public money 
which they had in the meantime becorne accustomed to, the law 
concerning political parties was finally passed in 1967. As a result, 
the parties in Germany ha ve had to submit public accounting since 
1968. 
3. The current extent ofpublic party financing is seen in the 
following figures: lf one adds the direct and the indirect government 
subsidies through "party taxes" and the tax benefits on dues and 
donations, it is apparent that parties, in tbe narrow sense, receive 
more than 60 percent of their finances from the treasury. (lf one 
counts only the national level of the parties and neglects the state 
and the locallevels the percentage is even higher because the 
centrallevel receives an even higher proportion of public money.) 
The state finances almost 100 percent of the parliamentary frac-
tions, party foundations, as weH as staffworkers ofparliamentary 
represen tati ves. 
In one legislative period, the parties, the parliamentary fractions, 
the party foundations, and the staff of the representatives received about 
six billion DM in public funds. In the last twenty-three years, this figure 
has increased ten limes and thus has grown much faster than all other 
possible comparative indicators. (The rate of growth does not change 
even when those two thirds ofthe expenses which the party foundations 
incur abroad bave been ornitted.) 
4. The bulk of the money i8 at tbe disposition of the leading 
grau ps. This underlines the fact that there are different levels within the 
parties. The main problems do not stern from the financing ofparties in 
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general, but from the financing ofthe "governing class." 
5. In the beginning it was understood thatpublic party financing 
should reduce the influence of Hbig money" and for this reason should be 
accompanied by ceilings for private contributors. In the end it proved 
impossible to establish any ceiling at a11. Contributors even enjoy tax 
benefits of almost fifty percent up to sums of 6,000 DM a year for 
singles (12,000 DM for married coup les). 
6. The rate of growth of public subsidies to parties, which is 
nothing short of aland of milk and honey, directs one' s attention to the 
problem of contro L The parliaments decide on pu blic financing of 
parties as "a matter of their own affairs" (Federal Constitutional Court). 
Those deciding and those benefiting are either one and the same, or they 
are c10sely associated with one another. 
7. The problem of contral is further intensified by the fact that 
party financing has an impact on power. The type and extent of political 
fmancing are part of the highly political ruIes of acquiring and maintaining 
power that all citizens have to obey. For this reason, satisfactory legal 
rules of party financing are. on the one hand, especially important for tbe 
legitimation of policy, as weIl as for the future political vigor afthe 
Federal Republic. On the other hand, because ofthe autonomous 
decision making power, these rules are especially endangered. 
8. In a parliamentary democracy, it is normally the opposition 
which, togetherwith the general public, denounces political flaws and 
criticizes the government majority which is responsible fot them. How-
ever, in taking decisions concerning political financing, the opposition 
regularly finds itself in the same boat. The big parties form a "political 
cartel," a term first used by aHo Kirchheimer, and thus escape control 
by the voters. Their \lotes no langer have an effeet on state financing of 
the parties. No matter w hat party they \lote for, (almost) an of them are 
bound together in a eartel. Control by the people is further weakened in 
that, of late, legislatures have begun to decide upon graduated increases 
in public party financing, valid for the following four years, at the begin-
ning of an election period. Le., far away from the next electoral vote. 
As a result, the entire burden of control usually lies with public opinion, 
and witb the Federal Canstitutional Court. 
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9. In some spectacular cases public criticism has succeeded in 
preventing misuse in financing politics (e.g., in the State ofHesse in 
,1988, in Hamburg in 1991, and in 1992 in the Saarland). The Iatest 
case happened last year in autumn, when the members of the 
Bundestag ofthe governing parties and cf the opposing SPD even tried 
to misuse their cartel power to change the Basic Law in order to raise 
their salary by a third and bind them to the salaries offederaljudges. 
After the protest of more than eighty pu blic law professors the 
Bundesratrefused to pass the amendment to the Constitution. 
10. This all-round control-deficit has contributed to the domi-
nating role of the Federal Constitutional Court as the central controlling-
body ofpolitical financing. In this capacity, itis active increating law in 
a comprehensive mannel' and has attempted, though in a round-about 
way. to draft a legal order for party financing. 
11. However, the possibilities of control through the Constitu-
tional Court are also limited. The Court cannot act on its own initiati ve. 
In matters regarding pubHc political-financing, citizens do not have 
standing to appeal to the Court. Only governments, parties, fractions, 
and representatives have this right and, for the most part, they do not 
use it. Jf a case is brought to court, nevertheless, it usually lasts for 
many years, and unti} now, the Court has ne ver obligated the reimburse-
ment of public funds which were gran ted unconstitutionally. The plain-
tiffs are chiefly outsider-parties and their representatives (especial1y the 
Greens, who have, however, become more and more established, the 
PDS [the former communist party of East Germany J and municipal 
elector-unions). On the other hand, the Court' s influence is ambiguous. 
Sometimes ithad, willingly or not, encouraged public financing with its 
decisions. 
12. Moreover, until now, control by the Court has been con-
centrated on party-financing in a narrow sense. As a result, the parties, 
using their autonomous decision-making power have redirected the 
funds to other institutions closely associated with them. Since the 
Court' s Decision of 1966limited public party-financing in a narrow 
sense, a gigantic re-routing of public money to parliamentary fractions, 
party foundations, representatives and their staff-workers has taken 
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place. Payments to fractions in theBundestag have increased by 
more than 3,200 percent from 3.4 million in 1966 to 107 million 
Marks in 1995, whereby almost 800 staffworkers are employed. 
Forthe same time period, payments to parliamentary fractions in the 
state legislatures have shot up from 7 to 131 million DM. Payments 
to party foundations have balIooned from 14 million DM in 1966 to 
620 million DM in 1994 (see Diagram B, pg. 34), i.e., they have 
increased by4,300 percent2• Within Germany itself, the founda-
tions employ almost 1,500 fuIl-time personnel. This enormous 
increase in money and staffled to a shift in the functions and tasks. 
The parliament fractions in particuIar do more and more concep-
tional and programmatic work, and new federal and state Iaws 
concerning fractions entitle them to make publicity which is not far 
from propaganda. Thus the constitutional barriers to state financing 
ofparties in the narrow sense have been circumvented. 
13. Above and beyond this, there are further indirect fonns of 
party financing which, until now, have also been barely subject to 
effecti ve control. The positions of the approximately 2,000 representa-
tives in the sixteen state legislatures, originally concei ved as honorary 
posts, were expanded, even in same very small and poor federal states 
like the Saarland, to fully paid and over-pensioned fuIl-time jobs, even 
though--at least in the original eleven federal states--the rights of the 
state legislatures have been considerably reduced in the last decades. 
At any rate, the rights are much more limited than those of the state 
legislatures in the U.S. or, for example, in Switzerland (whose mem-
bers, nevertheless, receive much lower compensation and even less 
pension). These findings led the director ofthe Iegislature ofLower 
Saxony to ask how long the representatives would be able to hide their 
over sized financial suits from the tax -payers. This overfinancing of 
2 During the super election year of 1994 and during the previous year the payments to the 
party foundations and the parliarnentary fractions decreased. This is in connection with the 
massive public discussion and the criUc by the Party Financing Commission (Parteien-
jinanzierungskommission). A temporary reduction, however, does not do very much, if thc 
problem area--the lack of legal order and discipline--is not attacked at the roots. 
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staterepresentatives in Germany makes it possible for them to act, as the 
formerpresidentoftheBundestag, von Hassel, putit, as "weIl-paid 
party workers." 
14. The previously mentioned "party taxes" are another fonn of 
indireet state financing of parties. They are high supplementary amounts 
which all representatives, even those on the municipalleveI, must pay to 
their parties in addition to their regular dues, ifthey do not want to 
endanger theirnomination for the next elections. So they are taken into 
account when the representatives decide on their salaries. This form of 
indireet state financing of parties amounts to seventy million DM a year. 
15. The desire to make up for the limits imposed by the Consti-
tutional Court on party-financing in a narrow sense was among the 
reasons behind the establishmentoffunds for the staffworkers ofthe 
representatives. In 1969, when i t was introduced, 3.25 million DM 
were made available for theBundestag; in 1995, 151 million DM were 
provided. This means that eachBunde stag representati ve receives . 
235,000 DM a year to pay staffworkers and that an together, 4,000 
staffworkers are in employment. (See Diagram C, pg. 35. Itis neces-
sary to note hefe that, with regard to the need for staff workers, the 
Bundestag cannot be compared to the American Congress; one reason 
is that the work -intensi ve drafting oflegislation is done mainly in the 
federal ministries.) In 1995, an additional 78 million DM were made 
a vailable for the staff-workers of representati ves in the state legislatures. 
And they are engaged in increasingl y more party work. 
16. The representatives themsel ves j ustified their generous 
compensation with the argument that such positions have to be attractive 
to the upper-income groups in order to motivate them for candidature. 
This argument is convincing only under the condition when true open-
ness and equal opportunity are part ofthe competition for positions. If 
they are missing, and if in the selection of candidates from small groups 
favoritism based on personal interests plays a role (as described by 
Erwin and Ute Scheueh), then the rewards for patronage lead to an 
intensification of exclusion of rather than openness for "qualified outsid-
ers." At this point, it is appropriate to note that there are no primaries 
in Germany; the parties possess adefacto nomination monopoly and 
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the voter often can onIy chose between fixed party Hsts, Le., he cannot 
make any choice regarding the selection of candidates. 
17. Another indireet form of party financing also consists of 
recruiting and promoting civil servants along party lines, with among 
others the expectation that the beneficiary of such patronage will be 
available for party work to a much greater degree. This phenomenon 
inc1udes not onIy political posts hut rather, to an ever-increasing degree, 
also "nonna}" dvil service positions. Any effecti ve counterweight i5 
lacking because all established parties do it on federal, state and local 
levels, so no party can really blame the others for it. President Roman 
Herzog calls these steadily-growing elements ofthe spoils system "the 
most grave and at the same time weakest point ofthe party state." 
According to the Constitution, political parties are actually not permitted 
to exert any influence in filling these positions. And yet the Constitu-
tional Court until now has not done anything to interrupt this tendency, 
maybe because a similar method is used when its own members are 
chosen. The phenomenon i8 further reflected in the large portion of 
public servants among the active members ofparties, and also in the 
"predominance ofthe civil service in the parliaments" (Federal Constitu-
tional Court). Forty percent ofthe representatives in the Bundestag 
come from the public sector, and in many state legislatures, it amounts 
to more than fifty percent. 
18. The rapidly growing fiscal volume of direct and indireet 
public party financing (and its shifting) is, of itself, an interesting phe-
nomenon. Even more interesting is the significance ofthese findings as 
an indicator of general characteristics of the way the political will is 
formed, as weH as the effeet of this change on the structure and the 
character of the party system i tself. 
19. If 1t is true that the appearance of government is usually 
reflected best in its financial status, one would suppose that party 
financing shows the general characteristics ofpolitics relatively c1early. 
No less a personage than the former president of the Federal Republic 
of Germany Richard von Weizsäcker reduced his criticism of parties in 
1992 to the caustic formulation that the parties were "power-crazy 
about electoral victory and power-forgetful about taking on the sub-
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weakness in problem solving and tbe dominantrole of personal interests 
almost to the point of caricature. And furthermore, party financing 
reflects most clearly the powerlessness ofthe citizens in the Federal 
Republic. That is indirect1y proven by other countries where the people 
exert a very strong influence over these matters, for example, in Swit-
zerland, where laws can be approved orrejected by a referendum; thus 
public financing is weIl controlled by the people. 
20. Concerning the impact of the party system, pu blic financing 
has the tendency to discriminate against the political rivals outside of 
parliament and, in so doing, to impair equal opportunity and openness in 
political competition, and the ability of the w hole system to react to new 
challenges as weil. 
21. In addition, the explosion of public funds threatens to make 
the so-called poli tical c1ass independent of citizens, party members and 
party-sympathizers and thereby intensify their own remoteness from the 
people, along with the people' s disenchantment with politics. 
22. Tbe Constitutional Court has, on the other hand, accepted 
that state subsidies were defined proportional to electoral success in the 
past, while in respect to participation in free timefor election propa-
ganda on public television, new and small challenger parties are less 
disadvantaged. On the other hand, tbe court has indeed tried to keep 
public financing open, forexample, by insisting thatlegislation is to 
inc1ude parties outside of parliament which have at least 0.5 percent of 
the vote. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has tried to maintain, to 
some extent, the parties' citizen orientation through special provisions 
for the organization of public financing. However, both attempts only 
affect the parties in a narrow sense and not the financing ofthe fractions 
and party foundations, nor the representatives and their staff. And it is 
exactly this type offinancing which has increased explosively. 
23. As a result of the increase in pu blic money and the shifts 
within the parties, it is increasingly probable that the dangers which 
farsighted academics and statesmen warned about in the early discus-
sions of party financing will gradually come to pass. Due to the fact that 
the governing class takes part in the distribution of public benefits and 
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posts, even when it is in the opposition, it can pay less attention to the 
desires and interests ofthe people because it is less dependent on their 
support and on the support ofthe party members. It is a most fascinat-
ing question whether these findings contribute in changing the character 
of the parties so that Volksparte ien (People' s Parties) are increasingly 
becoming fractions and representative parties; wh ether they are becom-
ing less a voice of the people and more state parties which seek prima-
rHy to safeguard their membership in the "power cartel," which guaran-
tees its members public money and positions, but otherwise, from the 
. top down, try to keep the people contented. 
So the question "Whose party is this?" might be answered: They 
. are no Ion ger the parties of the people; they are more and more becom-
" ing the parties of the political c1ass instead. Dieter Roth has shown that 
,the ties between parties and society have been loosened. It is worth 
asking wh ether this discontent is at least in part caused by the parties 
themselves and their self-serving excessive public financing. 
24. This sort of transformation of the parties, some elements of 
which the author has discussed in several publications regarding Ger-
many, has been investigated, in general, by the American political 
scientist Richard S. Katz and the Belgian political scientist Peter Mair in 
their re cent study of parties in western democracies. They have sug-
gested the term "cartel parties" to describe a character transfonnation of 
the parties today. In so doing, they pointed out that this development is 
especially pronounced in Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian 
countries, w hefe public financing, job patronage and a general style of 
party cooperation are especially strong. 
25. Katz and Mair seem to accept this development and try to 
adjust democratic theory accordingly. A constitutionallawyer and 
researcher of politics, concerned about slowing down this development 
might however point out that jf the rate of g~owth ofthe public financing 
of parties of the past thirty years continues in the future, the danger that 
Germany will ultimately face an "Italian" situation, or worse, will grow. 
For one thing, the limits and requirements which the German 
Federal Constitutional Court has developed for public party financing in 
a narrow sense (e.g., the absolute cut off amount, the demand for 
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transparency and, as far as possible, the inclusion of forces outside of 
parliament) must also be extended to those other areas to which the 
flow offinances have, in the meantime, been redirected (fractions, party 
foundations, representatives and their staff), and to the tasks which have 
been transferred to them as weIl. 
26. With respect to public financing, the most important task is 
the reform of the decision-making process of party financing. The 
people must be activated as a counter balance against misuse of power 
on the part oftheir representatives. A good deal could be achieved on 
the state level through referendums. However, such an instrument has 
unti1 now not been provided for on the federalleveL 
27. With regard to the practical possibilities, the American 
decision-making process could be considered. Following the passage 
of a constitutional arnendment a few years ago, Congress can make 
decisions concerning salary increases of representatives only affecting 
the legislative period following the decision. 
In this way, there are always general elections that take pI ace 
between the decision-taking and its effective date. This, in turn, im-
pedes improper regulations concerning personal advantage. It seems 
that in the Federal Republic such a procedure is in general advisable, 
not only for sa1ary increases for representati ves, but also for all fonns of 
party fmancing. However, it is unlikely that parliament will introduce 
such a change on its own. For this to succeed, the Federal Constitu-
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